In this paper we describe an algorithmic framework for a multi-modal logic arising from the combination of the system of modal (epistemic) logic devised by Meyer and van der Hoek for dealing with nonmonotonic reasoning with a deontic logic of the Jones and Pörn-type. The idea behind this (somewhat eclectic) formal set-up is to have a modal framework expressive enough to model certain kinds of deontic defeasibility, in particular by taking into account preferences on norms. The appropriate inference mechanism is provided by a tableau-like modal theorem proving system which supports a proof method closely related to the semantics of modal operators. We argue that this system is particularly well-suited for mechanizing nonmonotonic forms of inference in a monotonic multimodal setting.
Introduction
In the last few years application of defeasible (nonmonotonic) reasoning methods to normative rules has become a major topic in the study of norms and normative reasoning. Defeasible reasoning methods have been proven to be able to cope with a variety of important issues. A number of different approaches to formalizing defeasible deontic reasoning have been proposed and several frameworks have been exploited (see e.g. [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7] ). It turns out, however, that not much effort to account for deontic defeasibility in a computationally oriented manner has been made until now. This can partly be traced to the fact that usual nonmonotonic reasoning methods are not well-suited to computational treatment. On the other hand, it has been argued (see [6] ) that computational approaches to deontic defeasibility, e.g. in a logic programming setting, do not fit in with existing inference techniques from the field of nonclassical logic theorem proving. In this paper we shall present a computational framework for deontic defeasible reasoning based neither on logic programming nor on current nonmonotonic formalisms but on a system of modal (epistemic) logic devised by Meyer and van der Hoek [8] for dealing with nonmonotonic reasoning by monotonic means. The interesting point is that we extend Meyer and van der Hoek's system to a multi-modal system which subsumes a deontic logic of the Jones and Pörn-type [9, 10] . The idea behind this (somewhat eclectic) formal set-up is to have a modal framework expressive enough to model certain kinds of deontic defeasibility, in particular by taking into account preferences on norms, and that can be easily housed in the computational setting provided by the KEM theorem prover for (normal) modal logics presented in [11] . The paper is organized as follows. In the next two sections we provide a concise overview of Jones-Pörn's and Meyer-van der Hoek's logics. In section 4 we provide some hints about how represent defaults in Meyer van der Hoek's modal setting. In section 5 we shall outline the multi-modal system resulting from combining the above logics. In section 6 we shall provide a brief description of the computational framework KEM . In sections 7, 8 and 9 we shall show how all the above mentioned systems can be accommodated in KEM 's computational setting. Finally in section 10 we shall discuss reasoning with preferences in such a setting.
Deontic Logic
The deontic basis of our system is provided by Jones and Pörn's [9, 10] deontic logic DL, an extension of standard deontic logic (SDL) which incorporates, besides the normal deontic operators O i and P i , the deontic operators O s and P s . O i A and P i A (at a world w) mean (as in SDL): A holds in all, respectively some, of w's deontically ideal versions. O s A and P s A (at a world w) mean: A holds in all, respectively some, of w's "sub-ideal versions" (intuitively, a subideal version of w is a world where not everything that is ideal in w holds). DL allows us to define the following notions:
Since DL is a straightforward extension of SDL both O i , P i and O s , P s behave as normal KD-modalities. A model for DL is thus a structure:
where R i , R s ⊆ W × W are serial (non reflexive) relations on W (intuitive reading: wR i v = v is an ideal version of w, wR s v = v is a sub-ideal version of w), subject to the following conditions:
The meaning of C1 and C2 is that there cannot exist ideal worlds that are also sub-ideal, and every world is either ideal or sub-ideal relative to itself (notice that this amounts to introducing some form of reflexivity in the model). υ is as usual with the following clauses for O i and O s respectively:
A Modal Logic for Defeasible Reasoning (M DL)
Nonmonotonic reasoning is concerned with reasoning about and with defeasible information. In [8] this is modelled by a system of modal logic incorporating, besides the standard modal operators 2 and 3, n operators P 1 . . . P n which refer to "preferred" subsets of the set W of (epistemically) possible worlds.
A holds in all the i-preferred worlds (i.e. all the worlds in the set Σ i ). Axiomatically, such a system is obtained by adding to the standard S5 system the following axioms:
It turns out that this system (Meyer and van der Hoek's S5P (n) , henceforth referred to as M DL = modal default logic) is that of a multi-modal K45/S5 system with 2 and 3 behaving as S5 modalities and the P i behaving as K45 modalities. A model for M DL is thus a structure
where Σ i ⊆ W are subsets (possibly empty) of preferred worlds; R ⊆ W × W is the standard S5 accessibility relation on W ; R i = Σ × Σ i ⊆ R is a K45 (i.e. transitive and euclidean) accessibility relation on Σ i ; and υ is as usual with the following additional clause:
Representing defaults in M DL
According to [8] default reasoning is treated by translating the usual default rules in the M DL language as follows. Reiter's classical rule A:B C is translated into A ∧ 3B → P i C. This is read as "if A is true and B is considered possible, then C is preferred (practically believed)". Similarly, normal defaults become A ∧ 3B → P i B, and multiple defaults
. . where P 1 and P 2 are preference operators which can be associated either with the same cluster or with distinct preferred sets. In [8] this representation is extended with a mechanism for belief revision to obtain defeasibility. We propose a different solution, where defeasibility is obtained by analyzing defaults and assigning indices to them, according to the following definition. Let the input of our system be a knowledge base consituted of two sets of formulas: a set F of facts, and a set D of normal defaults:
Let each default
that we abridge as A ⇒ B.
Let D be the set of all such formulas and let S 1 , . . . , S n be all maximal subsets of D which are consistent with the facts (i.e. S i ∪ F is consistent and for no S j , S i ⊆ S j ). The key idea is that of introducing an operator P i in the consequent of every formula in S i , thus obtaining A ⇒ P i B for each formula A ⇒ B in S i . Let our translated knowledge base be F ∪D M , where D M denotes the set of modal defaults resulting from D by assigning preferences. As a result of this translation, we obtain that (a) the defaults included in each set S i will be assigned the same preference index while defaults occurring in different sets are assigned different preference indices (obviously defaults occurring in every set will receive all indices); (b) every inconsistency is avoided, since inconsistent defaults are assigned to different preferred sets. This approach recalls the treatment of prioritized defaults of Brewka [12, 13] . Note that if F ∪ D is consistent, then D M = D . Note also that in our translation we no longer need the justification part of the default, which was modalized in [8] as 3B, since our mechanism for assigning preferences takes care of consistency checks.
The above translation enables us to perform a kind of skeptical default inference, as the following example shows.
Given this knowledge base, our procedure gives rise to the following translation:
Clearly, the above premises imply both P 1 w, and P 2 (¬w). Defeasibility is obtained by revising indices after modifying the knowledge base. Let us assume that a new fact w is added to our knowledge base, so that we obtain the set ({p, q, w}, { p : r r , r : w w , q : ¬w ¬w }).
Clearly, we have now just one set of defaults whose conclusion is consistent with the facts, that is { p:r r , r:w w }. Therefore our translation simply gives:
p, q, w, p ⇒ P 1 r, r ⇒ P 1 w.
Note that the model just proposed can be extended with mechanisms for ordering single defaults, and/or for ordering sets of defaults, possibly on the basis of the ordering over single defaults (on the combination of consistency check and ordering, see [12, 13] . We will not consider such mechanisms, which have been much discussed in the literature, but if such methods were adopted it would be possible to restrict admitted set of defaults (and the corresponding preference operators) just to the best (maximal) sets of defaults. Let us consider a further example to illustrate our method.
Example 4.2 Acting in self-defence
The following knowledge base contains two conflicting rules, one saying that committing a tort implies a responsibility, the and the other saying that acting in self-defence implies no responsibility.
1a. John committed a tort.
3a. People commiting a tort is responsible.
4a. People acting in self-defence is not responsible.
This situation is translated into the following knowledge base
The corresponding modal translation is
Clearly, this set safely implies the two consequences P 1 r and P 2 ¬r.
A multi-modal M DL/DL system for defeasible normative reasoning
The idea of treating defeasible deontic reasoning by combining an existing deontic logic with an already existing nonmonotonic formalism has been suggested by [4, 5] . Following this suggestion, in this section we shall combine M DL with DL to obtain a formalism suited for dealing with defeasible rules in normative reasoning. It is immediate to see that the combination of M DL with DL results in a multi-modal KD/K45/S5 system having 2, 3,
and P s as its (independent but interacting) modalities. For ease of reference we shall call this system DDL (defeasible deontic logic). A models for DDL is a mixed M DL/DL structure
where Σ 1 , . . . Σ n , R, R i , R s and R j , (1 ≤ j ≤ n) are as before. This means, intuitively, that we have a semantic setting working with several kinds of worlds, i.e.
• possible worlds
• preferred worlds
• deontic worlds deontically ideal worlds deontically sub-ideal worlds
respectively. The resources available in DDL allow us to treat some cases involving defeasibility, and others appealing to the DL features. For example, the famous Chisholm paradox can be solved without using defeasibility, but by simply making use of DL. 2. Not-impregnating Suzy Mae commits John to not-marrying her.
3. Impregnating Suzy Mae commits John to marrying her.
John impregnates Suzy Mae.
As it is well-known there have been proposed several formalizations of this celebrated paradox (see [14] ). Let us take the following default-like version:
which corresponds substantially to the formalization proposed by Jones and Pörn [9] . In such a case we derive both O T B an O i O T ¬B (meaning that in all ideal situations there is the obligation O T ¬B, although in the actual, sub-ideal situation, it holds O T B).
Let us now consider the following example. This set has the following default-like representation:
From this we can derive that according to preference P 1 (which gives priority to religious prescriptions) Mustafa can be poligamous (P 1 P i p), and according to preference P 2 (which gives preference to Italian law) he cannot be poligamous (P 2 ¬P i p). Let us finally consider an example which clearly involves not only a conflict, but also the need to choose between different preferences. This set is translated into
In such a case we need to add to our system a mechanism for comparing preferences. Here the preference P 2 should be chosen because it is more specific than P 1 .
The computational framework KEM
In [11, 15] we presented a tableau-like proof system, called KEM which has been proved to be able to cope with a wide variety of (normal propositional) modal and multi-modal logics [16] . KEM is based on D'Agostino and Mondadori's [17] classical system KE, a combination of tableau and natural deduction inference rules which allows for a restricted ("analytic") use of the cut rule. The key feature of KEM , besides its being based neither on resolution nor on standard sequent/tableau inference techniques, is that it automatically generates models and checks them for putative contradictions using a label scheme to bookkeep "world" paths. In this section we shall present KEM in barest outline. We first recall some basic notions.
Our base language will be a modal propositional language L defined in the usual way. We shall use the letters A, B, C, ... to denote arbitrary formulas of L. By a signed formula (S-formula) we shall mean an expression of the form SA where S ∈ {T, F } and A is a formula of L (intended meaning: T A = A holds, F A = A does not hold at a given word in some Kripke model). We shall denote by X, Y, Z arbitrary signed formulas. As usual X C will be used to denote the conjugate of a S-formula X, i.e. the result of changing S to its opposite (with the exception of the following S-formulas: T 2A, F 3A, F 2A and F 3A which also have T 3¬A, F 2¬A, F 3¬A, T 2¬A respectively as their conjugates). Two S-formulas X, Z such that Z = X C , will be called complementary. As we have just said KEM approach wants we work with "world" labels. A "world" label is either a constant or a variable "world" symbol or a "structured" sequence of world-symbols we call a "world-path". Intuitively, constant and variable world-symbols stand for worlds and sets of worlds respectively, while a world-path conveys information about access between the worlds in it. We attach labels to S-formulas to yield labelled signed formulas (LS-formulas), i.e. pairs of the form X, i where X is a S-formula and i is a label. A LS-formula SA, i means, intuitively, that A is true (false) at the (last) world (on the path represented by) i. In the course of proof search, labels are manipulated in a way closely related to the semantics of modal operators and "matched" using a (specialized, logic-dependent) unification algorithm. That two world-paths i and k are unifiable means, intuitively, that they virtually represent the same path, i.e. any world which you could get by the path i could be reached by the path k and vice versa. LS-formulas whose labels are unifiable turn out to be true (false) at the same world(s) relative to the accessibility relation that holds in the appropriate class of models. In particular two LS-formulas X, X C whose labels are unifiable stand for formulas which are contradictory "in the same world". These ideas are formalized as follows.
Label formalism
Let L n be a multi-modal language with n distinct operators. For the sake of the following discussion let us assume that the semantics of L n is given by a structure M = W, Σ 1 , . . . , Σ m , R 1 , . . . , R n , υ where W is a (non-empty) set of possible worlds, 
The set of world-labels is now defined as = 1≤i i where i is :
That is a world-label is either (i) an element of the set Φ C , or (ii) an element of the set Φ V , or (iii) a path term (k , k) where (iiia) k ∈ Φ C ∪ Φ V and (iiib) k ∈ Φ C or k = (m , m) where (m , m) is a label. According to the above informal explanation, we may think of a label i ∈ Φ C as denoting a (given) world, and a label i ∈ Φ V as denoting a set or worlds (any world) in M . A label i = (k , k) may be viewed as representing a path from k to a (set of) world(s) k accessible from k. For instance, (w (W 3 , (w 3 , (W 2 , w 1 )) b(b(i) ), etc., a segment of i. Let s(i) denote any segment of i (obviously, by definition every segment s(i) of a label i is a label); then h(s(i)) will denote the head of s(i). For any label i, we define the length of i, l(i), as the number of world-symbols in i, i.e. l(i) = n ⇔ i ∈ n . s n (i) will denote the segment of i of lenght n, i.e. s n (i) = s(i) such that l(s(i)) = n. For any label i, l(i) > n, we define the countersegment-n of i, c n (i) (i.e. what remains of i after deleting s n (i)), as:
We shall call a label i restricted if h(i) ∈ Φ C , otherwise we call it unrestricted.
We shall say that a label k is i-preferred iff k ∈ i where
and that a label k is i-ground
Unification scheme
KEM 's label unification scheme involves two kinds of unifications, respectively "high" and "low" unifications. "High" unifications are meant to mirror specific accessibility constraints; they are used to build "low" unifications, which account for the full range of conditions governing the appropriate accessibility relation. We then begin by defining the basic notion of "high" unification. First we define a substitution in the usual way as a function
where − = − Φ V . For two labels i, k and a substitution σ, if σ is a unifier of i and k then we shall say that i and k are σ-unifiable. We shall (somewhat unconventionally) use (i, k)σ to denote both that i and k are σ-unifiable and the result of their unification. On this basis we define several specialised, logicdependent notions of both σ "high" (or σ L ) and σ "low" (or σ L ) unification (see [11] ). For example, the notion of two labels i, k being σ K −, σ D −, and σ S5 -unifiable is defined in the following way:
at least one of i and k is restricted, and for every
For example, let i = (w 3 , (W 1 , w 1 )) and k = (W 3 , (w 2 , w 1 )) be two labels to be unified. They σ K -unify to (w 3 , (w 2 , w 1 )) according to the above definition of σ K -unification. Notice that they are also σ D -unifiable (this preserves the obvious relation between the K and D logics). Let us consider now two labels i = (w 3 , (W 1 , w 1 )) and k = (W 3 , (W 2 , w 1 )). They σ D -unify to (w 3 , (w 2 , w 1 )) according to the above definition of σ D -unification. They are not, however, σ K -unifiable (according to the second condition of the above definition) since the segments (W 1 , w 1 )), (W 2 , w 1 ) are not σ K -unifiable (by the first condition of the above definition). The reason is that in the "non idealisable" logic K the "denotations" of W 1 and W 2 may be empty (i.e. there can be no worlds accessible from w 1 ), which obviously makes their unification impossible, while in the "idealisable" logic D they are not empty, which makes them to be unifiable "on" any constant. As to the notion of σ S5 -unification, take i = (w 3 , (W 1 , w 1 )) as before, and k = (W 2 , (W 1 , (w 2 , w 1 )) ). These labels σ S5 -unify to w 3 according to the above definition of σ S5 -unification, which for a label of the form (m , m) amounts to deleting m from the path to a world m (since, if access is "ubiquitous", then the "way to" m is irrelevant).
For L = K, D, S5 the notion of two labels i, k being σ L -unifiable is defined quite simply as:
Notice that in the simple cases above
e. high and low unifications are alike). For a more complex case see section 9 below.
Inference rules
The following formulation uses a generalized "α, β, ν i , π i " form of SmullyanFitting's "α, β, ν, π" unifying notation.
Here the α-rules are just the familiar linear branch-expansion rules of the tableau method, while the β-rules correspond to such common natural inference patterns as modus ponens, modus tollens, etc. (i, k, m stand for arbitrary labels). The rules for the modal operators are as usual. "m new" in the proviso for the ν i -and π i -rule means: m must not have occurred in any label yet used. Notice that in all inferences via an α-rule the label of the premise carries over unchanged to the conclusion, and in all inferences via a β-rule the labels of the premises must be σ L -unifiable, so that the conclusion inherits their unification. P B (the "Principle of Bivalence") represents the (LS-version of the) semantic counterpart of the cut rule of the sequent calculus (intuitive meaning: a formula A is either true or false in any given world, whence the requirement that j should be restricted). P N C (the "Principle of Non-Contradiction") corresponds to the familiar branch-closure rule of the tableau method, saying that from the occurrence of a pair of LS-formulas X, i, X C , k such that (i, k)σ L (let us call them σ L -complementary) on a branch we may infer the closure ("×") of the branch. The (i, k)σ L in the "conclusion" of P N C means that the contradiction holds "in the same world".
Proof search
Let Γ = {X 1 , . . . , X m } be a set of S-formulas. Then T is a KEM-tree for Γ if there exists a finite sequence (T ∞ , T ∈ , . . . , T \ ) such that (i) T ∞ is a 1-branch tree consisting of {X 1 , i . . . , X m , i}, where i is an arbitrary constant label; (ii) T \ = T , and (iii) for each i < n, T +∞ results from T by an application of a rule of KEM . A branch τ of a KEM -tree T of LS-formulas is said to be σ L -closed if it ends with an application of P N C, open otherwise. A KEM -tree T is said to be σ L − closed if all its branches are σ L -closed. As usual with tableau methods, a set Γ of formulas is checked for consistency by constructing a KEM -tree for Γ. It is worth noting that each KEM -tree is a (class of) Hintikka's model(s) where the labels denote worlds (i.e. Hintikka's modal sets), and the unifications behave according to the conditions placed on the appropriate accessibility relations. By a KEM − proof of a formula A we mean a σ L -closed KEM -tree for F A, i. Moreover we say that a formula A is a KEM-consequence of a set of formulas Γ if A occurs in all the open branches of a KEM -tree for Γ. We now describe a sistematic procedure for KEM . First we define the following notions.
Given a branch τ of a KEM -tree, we shall call an LS-formula X, i Eanalysed in τ if either (i) X is of type α and both α 1 , i and α 2 , i occur in τ ; or (ii) X is of type β and one of the following conditions is satisfied: (a) if β
iii) X is of type ν i and ν 0 , (m, i) occurs in τ for some m ∈ Φ V not previously occurring in τ , or (iv) X is of type π i and π 0 , (m, i) occurs in τ for some m ∈ Φ C not previously occurring in τ .
We shall call a branch τ of a KEM -tree E-completed if every LS-formula in it is E-analysed and it contains no complementary formulas which are not σ L -complementary. We shall say a branch τ of a KEM -tree completed if it is E-completed and all the LS-formulas of type β in it either are analysed or cannot be analysed. We shall call a KEM -tree completed if every branch is completed.
At each stage of proof search (i) we choose an open non completed branch τ . If τ is not E-completed, then (ii) we apply the 1-premise rules until τ becomes E-completed. If the resulting branch τ is neither closed nor completed, then (iii) we apply the 2-premise rules until τ becomes E-completed. If the resulting branch τ is neither closed nor completed, then (iv) we choose an LS-formula of type β which is not yet analysed in the branch and apply P B so that the resulting LS-formulas are β 1 , i and β (v) ("Modal P B") if the branch is not E-completed nor closed, because of complementary formulas which are not σ L -complementary, then we have to see whether a restricted label unifying with both the labels of the complementary formulas occurs previously in the branch; if such a label exists, or can be built using already existing labels and the unification rules, then the branch is closed, (vi) we repeat the procedure in each branch generated by P B.
The above procedure is based on on a (deterministic) procedure working for canonical KEM -tree. A KEM -tree is said to be canonical if it is generated by applying the rules of KEM in the following fixed order: first the α-, ν i -and π i -rule, then the β-rule and P N C, and finally P B. Two interesting properties of canonical KEM -trees are (i) that a canonical KEM -tree always terminates, since for each formula there are a finite number of subformulas and the number of labels which can occur in the KEM -tree for a formula A (of L) is limited by the number of modal operators belonging to A, and (ii) that for each closed KEM -tree a closed canonical KEM -tree exists. Proofs of termination and completeness for canonical KEM -trees are given in [16] .
In this section we show how the computational framework developed in the preceeding sections can be used to solve contradictions in the way described in section 4. As it well known, tableau methods, and in particular KEM , can be used as model building systems [11] . In what follows we exploit the obvious fact that the set of formulas in each branch τ of a KEM -tree is consistent (i.e. it has a model) if τ is open, otherwise it is inconsistent. Since we check sets of premises for consistency, we first run KEM on the given set and, finally, we solve contradictions, on each closed branch, by assigning a different preference to the consequents of the translated defaults implying contradictions. To use practically this procedure we have to keep trace of dependencies according to the following definition.
Definition 10.1
• Each formula depends on itself;
• a formula B depends on A either if it is obtained through an application of the α-ν i -and π i -rules or it is obtained through an application of KEM 's rules on formulas depending on A;
• a formula C depends on A, B if it is obtained through an application of a β-rule where A, B are its premises;
• if C depends on A, B then C depends on A and C depends on B
In the course of model construction we shall only keep trace of the dependencies from the premises, i.e. we avoid all the intermediate formulas. Obviously in order to solve pairs of complementary formulas and to assign preferences accordingly, we have to take into account only the premises which essentially imply one of them. Let A and B be two complementary formulas in a closed branch τ ; let C A be the set of premises from which A depends; let C B be the set of premises from which B depends; let D(C A ∪ C B ) be the defaults in C A ∪ C B . Note that, since facts are assumed to be consistent, the set D(C A ∪ C B ), which we call a culprit set, is responsible for the inconsistency, We say that a set S ⊆ D is conflict free if it does not contain any culprit sets. We use KEM inference procedure to find all the D(C A ∪ C B ) ⊆ D, and we use such information to build all maximal conflict free sets S of defaults. Finally we assign preferences in such a way that all formulas in each S have the same preference.
We give an example of how we establish consistent subsets and assign preferences.
Example 10.2
Let us consider the following knowledge base (F, D) , where F = {p} and D = {p → q, p → r, p → s, p → (¬q ∨ ¬r) ∧ ¬s}.
On the right column we wrote the dependencies (for the sake of economy we have deleted the irrelevant steps). We obtain the following inconsistent sets of defaults: {1, 2, 4} and {3, 4}. Therefore the maximal consistent subsets and their associate preferences are:
It is worth noting that the ability of KEM to determine the inconsistent subsets of a contradictory one is due to its inference rules, in particular P B and the β-rules.
After assigning preferences, we can query the system whether a formula X is a consequence of our knowledge base simply by running a refutation KEM -tree for the set consisting of the premises and X C .
Final Remarks
It was not the objective of this paper to develop a theory of defeasible deontic reasoning. Our motivation was rather practical. We sought for computationally tractable and easily implementable theorem proving techniques suitable for dealing with some pieces of normative reasoning involving defeasible rules. The preceding discussion was thus mainly aimed at showing the potential scope of application of the method. In effect, we believe that the method for solving contradictions by assigning preferences outlined in section 10 nicely exploits the computational and proof-theoretical advantages offerred by the modal theorem proving system KEM . As we have argued elsewere this system enjoys most of the features a suitable proof search system for modal (and in general nonclassical) logics should have. In contrast with (both clausal and non-clausal) resolution methods, and in general "translation-based" methods [18, 19] , it works for the full modal language (thus avoiding any preprocessing of the input formulas), and it is flexible enough to be extended to cover any setting having a Kripke-model based semantics (this is clearly shown by our treatment of Jones and Pörn logic DL where the rules specific for such a logic should take care not only of the propositional and modal part but also of the structure of the labels and the relationship between labels and formulas; for example we added another closure rule i∈Φ i ,i∈Φ s × which states that no world can be at the same time an ideal and a sub-ideal version of itself; this result is achieved by determining when a deontic word is ideally (sub-ideally) reflexive (i r ) by means of another peculiar inference rule). From this perspective our methods is similar to sequent or tableau proof methods ( [20, 22] ). Nevertheless, it has several advantages over most tableau/sequent based theorem proving methods: being based on D'Agostino an Mondadori's classical proof system KE, it eliminates the typical redundancy of the standard cut-free methods and, thanks to its label unification scheme, it offers a simple and efficient solution to the permutation problem which notoriously arises at the level of the usual tableau-sequent rules for the modal operators. However, unlike e.g. Wallen's [21] connection method, it uses a natural and easily implementable style of proof construction, and so it appears to provide an adequate basis for combining both efficiency and naturalness. (As to the implementation the reader is referred to [15] where a Prolog implementation is provided, and to [23] where some related issues are discussed).
